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ABSTRACT
Community norm violations can impair constructive commu-
nication and collaboration online. As a defense mechanism,
community moderators often address such transgressions by
temporarily blocking the perpetrator. Such actions, however,
comewith the cost of potentially alienating communitymem-
bers. Given this tradeoff, it is essential to understand to what
extent, and in which situations, this common moderation
practice is effective in reinforcing community rules.
In this work, we introduce a computational framework for
studying the future behavior of blocked users on Wikipedia.
After their block expires, they can take several distinct paths:
they can reform and adhere to the rules, but they can also re-
cidivate, or straight-out abandon the community. We reveal
that these trajectories are tied to factors rooted both in the
characteristics of the blocked individual and in whether they
perceived the block to be fair and justified. Based on these
insights, we formulate a series of prediction tasks aiming to
determine which of these paths a user is likely to take after
being blocked for their first offense, and demonstrate the fea-
sibility of these new tasks. Overall, this work builds towards
a more nuanced approach to moderation by highlighting the
tradeoffs that are in play.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The health of online communities is often threatened by in-
dividuals that violate their norms and rules [24]. Communi-
ties have limited defense mechanisms against such offenses,
ranging from the deletion of problematic comments [4], to
This paper is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national (CC-BY 4.0) license. Authors reserve their rights to disseminate
the work on their personal and corporate Web sites with the appropriate
attribution.
WWW ’19, May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA
© 2019 IW3C2 (International World Wide Web Conference Committee),
published under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 License.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6674-8/19/05.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3308558.3313638
temporarily blocking the perpetrators, to outright excluding
them [22]. Such actions, however, come at the cost of po-
tentially alienating valuable community members and raise
issues of freedom of speech, fairness and bias [22, 25, 45].
Considering their potential negative impacts, it is important
to understand to what extent, and in which situations, these
moderation mechanisms are effective at enforcing commu-
nity norms.
In this work we take a first step towards answering these
questions by focusing on temporary blocks in the Wikipedia
community of editors. Unlike othermoderation actions, these
have the explicitly stated purpose of “deterring any future
possible repetitions of inappropriate conduct” by the perpe-
trators, while reintegrating them in the community (thus
the temporary nature of the block). However, following
their initial block, nearly half of first-time offenders either
recidivate—18% of established members violate the rules
again within 6 months of the block—or straight-out abandon
the community—30% of established members depart within
6 months (a third of which depart during the block). This
discrepancy between the stated goal and the empirical out-
comes of temporary blocks motivates an investigation into
the factors that determine the likely trajectory a commu-
nity member will take after their block expires: redemption,
recidivism or departure.
We ground our investigation in offline theories of deter-
rence and defiance [46], which point to at least three broad
classes of factors determining future compliance: those per-
taining to the characteristics of the perpetrator [48], those
pertaining to the actual severity of the punishment [16, 27]
and those pertaining to whether the perpetrator perceives
their treatment as fair [40]. While relying on these theories
to guide our selection of factors and potential confounds
to consider in our analysis, we refrain from drawing any
direct parallels between offline and online rule-enforcement
strategies given their distinct nature and goals.
Individual characteristics. Behavior of community mem-
bers and their adherence to community norms has been
shown to vary according to their level of involvement with
the community [6, 10, 18, 42]. We find that individuals that
exhibit a high level of community involvement (e.g., have
interacted with more users over a longer period of time) are
less likely to abandon the community during a temporary
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block. On the other hand, these individuals are also more
likely to recidivate soon after the block. This suggests that
users with high community involvement are more immune
to the effects of blocks, both undesired (departure) and de-
sired (reforming).
Block duration. Existing literature on offline rule com-
pliance varies in their accounts of how the nature of the
punishment determines the likelihood of recidivism [49].
The traditional (institutional) perspective is that the severity
of the punishment is the main factor determining compli-
ance [16, 27]. A contrasting (normative) perspective, how-
ever, argues that perhaps a more important factor is whether
the perpetrator regards the punishment as being fair and
justified [32, 48]. In the context of the Wikipedia community,
we find that even though longer—and thus more severe—
blocks come at the cost of higher departure rates, they do
not appear to have any effect on recidivism.
Perceived fairness. To capture whether an individual per-
ceives their initial block as fair, we leverage a mechanism
specific to online moderation: block appeals. Blocked indi-
viduals can contest a block by opening a discussion with
Wikipedia moderators during the block. In turn, modera-
tors have the option to lift the block early—i.e., to unblock
the individual—as a result of these discussions. This process
provides us with a glimpse into a blocked individual’s per-
ception of fairness: we can analyze their language as well as
the outcome of the appeal.
Using this methodology, we find that users who perceive
the block to be unfair have an increased rate of recidivism,
while those that acknowledge their wrongdoing and apol-
ogize have a decreased rate. Furthermore, even though the
block duration itself does not appear to affect recidivism,
the post-hoc reduction of this duration by a moderator dras-
tically diminishes recidivism rates, perhaps by improving
the user’s perception of the moderation system as being fair
and reasonable. Combined, these results suggest that the
effectiveness of temporary blocks is not so much dependent
on their actual severity, but rather on the blocked user’s
perception of how appropriate the block is.
To summarize, in this work we:
• investigate the effectiveness of temporary blocks by
considering possible trajectories an individual can take
after their block expires;
• reveal factors that are indicative of these future tra-
jectories, reflecting both the engagement patterns of
the blocked individual, as well their perception of the
fairness of the block;
• analyze the relative importance of each of these factors
by using them in a series of forecasting tasks aiming
to determine which path a user is likely to take after
their first block.
More broadly, we propose a computational framework for
analyzing the outcomes of a common moderation practice in
online communities. In doing so, we expose the underlying
tradeoffs and provide the means to further explore factors
that mediate them.
2 BLOCKS ONWIKIPEDIA
While Wikipedia is primarily known as an online encyclope-
dia, it also plays host to a vibrant community of editors who
continually write new articles and improve existing ones.
To support this community, Wikipedia has a feature known
as talk pages: special pages on which editors can discuss a
particular article or Wikipedia policy, or simply unwind with
casual conversation. Every Wikipedia article has an associ-
ated talk page, on which editors can discuss proposed edits to
the article. Similarly, every registered user has an associated
user talk page, where other editors can engage directly with
the respective user on issues pertaining to their general be-
havior. This is where the social functions of the community
surface: editors discuss inappropriate behavior and norm
violations, ask for support, offer advice or encourage each
other. In this work we use the complete conversational his-
tory between English Wikipedia editors on both article and
user talk pages. With over 90 million conversations between
4 million users on 24 million talk pages, this is one of the
largest collections of public conversations [20].
Like many online communities, Wikipedia has a moder-
ation system aimed at imposing community rules. What
makes Wikipedia particularly suitable for our proposed in-
vestigation is that its rules apply uniformly to the entire com-
munity and moderation is entirely transparent to the public
[13]. This is unlike other large communities, such as Reddit,
where rules can vary drastically between sub-communities
and where aspects of the moderation remain private [4].
Blocking mechanism.Wikipedia moderators (formally re-
ferred to as administrators, though we will continue to use
the term “moderator” as we are focused on their role in main-
taining community norms) are elected from among commu-
nity members through public elections [1, 30]. Among other
privileges, moderators have the ability to block users from
making any edits or comments. They can either block a user
indefinitely, in cases of accounts that are clearly used for
bad-faith purposes, or temporarily if they see the user as
a potentially valuable member of the community that has
momentarily gone awry. In fact, the stated purpose of tem-
porary blocks is “to deter any future possible repetitions of
inappropriate conduct”, thus keeping the door open for rein-
tegration after the expirations of the blocks.1 Our focus in
this work is on temporary blocks (henceforth simply called
blocks), and their effectiveness in reforming blocked users.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Blocking_policy
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Total number of blocks 104,245
Number of blocked users 72,332
Number of blocking moderators 1,706
Users with block reason in disruption subset 21,043
Users with first block in disruption subset 18,909
Users remaining after minimum activity filters 6,026
Table 1: Statistics of the blocked users dataset.
When temporarily blocking an individual, moderators are
required to notify the user by posting a message on their
user talk page. This notification includes the reason for the
block and its duration. The duration of the block is at the dis-
cretion of the moderator, and can vary greatly—the standard
deviation of block durations is 194 days. However, this high
variance is largely the result of a small set of extreme out-
liers, and in practice most blocks are very brief—the median
duration is 1 day.
For the duration of the block, the targeted user may not
contribute to Wikipedia articles or make any comments on
talk pages, with the sole exception of their own user talk
page, where they are allowed to discuss the block.
Block reason.Whenmoderators block a user, theymust cite
a reason that reflects one of the community rules. Wikipedia
groups these reasons under two broad categories: protec-
tion and disruption. The former concerns behaviors that may
put Wikipedia editors or Wikipedia itself at risk, such as
making legal threats, releasing personal information or vio-
lating copyright law. The latter concerns the health of the
community—or, as Wikipedia phrases it, maintaining a “civil,
collegial atmosphere”. We identify a subset of four such dis-
ruption block types relating to breaches of community norms
(rather than to legal concerns specific toWikipedia): personal
attacks and incivility, harassment, edit warring, and disrup-
tive editing. These reflect norms that can be broken even by
established and valuable members of the community, unlike
spam or vandalism which most often come from illegitimate,
disruption-only accounts.
Blocked users dataset.We extract information about the
nature of the blocks from the block log, a centralized and pub-
lic record of all blocks that have ever happened onWikipedia
containing over 136,000 actions (including both blocks and
manual block modifications) at time of collection. We auto-
matically extract from this log the block’s duration,2 its type,
its date,3 and the involved users (blocking moderator and
blocked individual). We seek to focus our analysis on actual
2We merge consecutive blocks and account for post-hoc reduction in block
duration.
3In our analysis we discard blocks happening in the first five years of the
community, allowing for Wikipedia community norms to stabilize [13, 17].
members of the community as opposed to disruption-only
accounts, because such accounts are made in bad faith and
hence have no reason to reform once caught [15]. To this
end, we discard accounts whose first block was not one of
the four disruption block types previously described, and
impose a minimum activity before the first block: at least one
month and eight comments. Finally, we join the resulting
block meta-data with the conversational record. Details of
the resulting dataset are summarized in Table 1. We make
this processed dataset publicly available4 to encourage the
study of moderation in a community where all activity is by
design fully transparent and public.5
3 TRAJECTORIES AFTER THE BLOCK
After their block expires, a user can take several distinct
trajectories: they can reform and adhere to the rules, but they
can also recidivate, or straight-out abandon the community.
Here we formally define these (un)desired outcomes and
reveal their relative prevalence.
Throughout, we focus on the very first block a user re-
ceives, thus discarding any potential lingering effects of pre-
vious blocks and putting all users in our dataset on equal
ground at the time of investigation. We consider a maximum
future horizon of 6 months, and thus are constrained to dis-
card users whose initial block takes place less than 6 months
before the end of our dataset (June 2018) since for these
we cannot know what the future holds. This is a common
solution for limited horizon in longitudinal studies [10].
Departure.Wikipedia and other collaborative communities
have traditionally struggled to retain their members [17].
Thus, the risk of alienating users needs to be taken into
consideration when evaluating the efficacy of moderation.
This is particularly true for temporary blocks, which by their
very nature aim at re-integrating the targeted user into the
community rather than discouraging them to contribute
again (for which a moderator would use a permanent block).
We consider a user to depart from the community at the
time of their last comment on community talk pages; we use
this instead of their last edit on an article as the indicator
of quitting because we are specifically interested in their
engagement with the community. We impose the same 6
month maximum future horizon as we did when considering
recidivism. Out of all 6,026 blocked users selected for this
study (Section 2), 30% depart in the 6 months following their
first block, and 10% depart during the block itself.
To illustrate the connection between departure rates and
the block itself, Figure 1 compares the probability of a user
4As part of ConvoKit (convokit.cornell.edu)
5All editors are expressly informed, during all edits, that “Work submitted
to Wikipedia can be edited, used, and redistributed—by anyone”, where
“work” is defined as content on any Wikipedia page, talk pages included.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Ownership_of_content.
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Figure 1: Probability of a user quitting at a given community
age (in months), given that they were never blocked before
(blue squares), blocked anytime prior to that month (orange
circles) or blocked in that same month (green diamonds).
The trends continue beyond the 12 months illustrated here.
abandoning the community at different stages in their com-
munity life (i.e., time since their first activity), conditioning
on whether (and when) they were blocked before. We first
note that departure is not independent from blocking events
(compare blue squares with orange circles): users are much
more likely to depart if they were blocked before, especially
in the first months of their life in the community. But even
controlling for the fact that a user was previously blocked
(compare orange circles with green diamonds), they aremuch
more likely to depart during the month of their block. This
strong recency effect shows that blocking and departure are
events that are also temporally connected.
Recidivism. A previously-blocked user recidivates if they
are blocked again for any other breach of community rules,
and reforms if they never get blocked again. There is a wide
variance in how long it takes recidivst users to re-offend.
While some get blocked again within a week, others remain
“clean” for years before re-offending. Only 47.7% of blocked
users in our dataset have no (blocked) offenses after their
first block. Among the users who do have a second known
offense, the median time to reoffense is 32 days.
To study recidivism at different temporal scales, we con-
sider two categories of users: long-term recidivists are those
who re-offend within the next 6 months after their initial
block, and short-term recidivists are the subset who re-offend
within the first week after their first offense. Out of all
blocked users selected for this study, 38.5% breach the norms
again in the 6 months following their initial block; and 15.4%
recidivate in just one week after the initial block.
To put recidivism rates into perspective and differentiate
the phenomenon from general rule violations, Figure 2 com-
pares the probability of a user getting (re)blocked at different
Figure 2: Probability of a user getting blocked at a given com-
munity age (in months), given that they were never blocked
before (blue squares), previously blocked anytime prior to
that month (orange circles) or previously blocked in that
same month (green diamonds).
stages in their community life, conditioned on whether (and
when) they were already blocked or not. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, individual block events are not independent: the
probability of being blocked is much higher for individuals
who were already blocked before than for those that were
not, even after controlling for community age (compare blue
squares with orange circles). We also observe a dramatic
decrease in probability of recidivism during the first year of
a user’s community age. Importantly, this effect is specific
to recidivism, rather than just reflecting a tendency to get
blocked in general—the probability of getting blocked for the
first time (blue squares) stays relatively flat over time. Finally,
as in the case of departure, we also observe a recency effect
(compare green diamonds with orange circles), showing that
consecutive blocks are temporally related events.
Having established a relation between blocks and depar-
ture or recidivism, we now move towards a more thorough
analysis of the factors that are in play. We will explore two
broad classes of factors inspired by theories of deterrence
and defiance [46]. The first class of factors concerns the
characteristics of the perpetrator (Section 4): some types
of individuals might simply be more likely to (re)offend or
depart. The second class of factors concerns the actual con-
text of the block: its actual severity and how the perpetrator
perceives it (Section 5).
4 USER CHARACTERISTICS
We have already seen that community age is an important
factor mediating the likelihood of departure and (re)offense:
overall, newcomers are more likely than experienced users
to follow one of these undesired paths after being temporar-
ily blocked. Here we explore how these outcomes relate to
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Figure 3: We matched comparable blocked users with opposite outcomes: (a) departs or not during the first block; (b) offends
or not after the first block. For eachmatched pair, we also select a control pair of users (with the same opposite outcomes) who
were not blocked.
other user characteristics, focusing on factors indicating a
member’s level and type of engagement in the community.
We consider two broad types of features: how active the
user is and how broad their social connections are in the
community. To foreshadow our findings, we find that indi-
viduals that are more active in the community are overall
more immune to blocks: they are both less likely to depart
during a block, but also less likely to reform. However, the
way an individual spreads their activity is also informative:
if their activity is directed at a broader set of users they are
more likely to either depart or reform.
Activity level.We consider both the number of comments
a user contributes to other users’ talkpages (contributed ac-
tivity), as well as the number of comments they receive from
other users on their own talkpage (received activity) before
the block. To disentangle a user’s activity from their commu-
nity age, we normalize these measures by the number of days
between the user’s first recorded activity in the community
and the time of the block.
Activity spread. An active individual can either engage a
broad audience, or instead concentrate on a narrow set of
individuals. We capture the received activity spread of an
individual by counting the number of unique users who
wrote comments on their talk page before the block, then
normalizing it by the total number of such comments. A
higher value of this ratio indicates brief interactions with a
relatively large number of peers, while conversely, a smaller
ratio indicates extended interactions with a relatively small
group of peers. Analogously, we define contributed activity
spread as the ratio between the number of other users’ talk
pages to which an individual contributed comments and the
number of such comments they contributed.
Departure.Tomakemeaningful comparisons between users
who depart during their first block and those who don’t,
hence eliminating trivial confounds, we use a matching tech-
nique inspired by causal inference methods [43]. As illus-
trated in Figure 3a (top), we pair each departing user with a
user whose first block took place on the same date (within 1%
tolerance) but who stayed active for at least 6 more months
(our maximum future horizon). This procedure results in
1,156 paired departing and staying users.
As a secondary question, we also want to understand
whether any differences we observe are specific to blocked
individuals, or generally characterize community departure.
To this end, for each matched pair of blocked departing-
staying individuals, we construct a control pair of departing-
staying individuals that were not blocked. This control pair
consists of a non-blocked departing individual with the same
departure date (within tolerance) as the blocked departing
individual, and a staying individual who remained active at
least 6 months past that date. This process is also illustrated
in Figure 3a (bottom).
Figure 4 summarizes how our engagement factors relate
to departure during the block (solid bars). Departed users re-
ceive and contribute less daily activity in their life before the
block than non-departed users. The activity they do receive
comes from a broader set of users, potentially signaling they
are not integrated into a tight social group.6 This is however
not true for the spread of the activity they contribute, which
is similar between departing and staying users.
We note that these relations between activity and depar-
ture are specific to blocked individuals (compare hashed bars
in Figure 4). Departing users in our matched pairs do not
have significantly different activity levels or activity spreads
than their staying counterparts. This finding reinforces the
6These trends continue to hold, and remain significant, if we consider only
the top half of active users in our comparison, thus separating them from
the previously described trends in raw activity counts.
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Figure 4: Difference between the community engagement patterns of departing and staying users. From left to right: receiving
activity level, contributed activity level, receiving activity spread, contributed activity spread. Solid bars compare blocked
departing and staying users; hashed bars compare non-blocked departing and staying users. Throughout errorbars indicate
95% binomial proportion confidence intervals.
notion that departure during a block is a distinct phenome-
non from departure in general.
Recidivism. Having shown that activity level and activity
spread are indicative of departure, we now explore whether
they might also signal recidivism. As before, we use match-
ing to eliminate trivial confounds. In this setting, the pri-
mary concern is that higher activity might trivially result in
higher likelihood of recidivism merely because users with
more activity tend to write more comments, which means
they have more things they could be blocked for, probabilis-
tically speaking. We therefore match each recidivist user by
counting the number of actions (new comments, comment
edits, or comment deletions) they performed between con-
secutive blocks, and choosing a reformed user who made
at least that many actions in their lifetime after their first
(and only) block; this is visualized in Figure 3b (top). This
ensures that both users had at least as many opportunities to
be blocked, so any differences that remain must result from
the quality, not quantity, of their actions. This pairing results
in 1,332 paired short-term recidivists and reformed users and
3,278 paired long-term recidivists and reformed users.
As in the departure analysis, we also find a set of control
pairs to help us understand whether any differences we ob-
serve are specific to recidivism, or apply generally to norm
violations. Each control pair contains a first-time offender
and a user who is completely clean up to the time of the
first-time offender’s block. Selection is done on number of
actions, just like the pairing of the experimental group. This
procedure is visualized in Figure 3b (bottom).
Figure 5 summarizes how our engagement factors relate
to recidivism and to blocking in general. For space consid-
erations, we only present results for long-term recidivism;
short term recidivism shows the same trends and statistical
significance levels. Recidivist users receive and contribute
more daily comments, but the received activity comes from
a narrower set of users (solid bars). Taken together, these
indicate that recidivist users’ interaction patterns have more
depth than breadth; they engage with a smaller set of users
but each engagement is more prolonged. This may signal
the presence of sustained back-and-forth with a restricted
circle of editors. These engagement patterns echo general
blocking patterns (hashed bars): unsurprisingly, the type of
individuals that are likely to get blocked in general are also
more likely to recidivate (although this was not the case for
departure). In the following sections wewill complement this
general observation by exploring factors that relate to the
context of the first block, and thus are specific to recidivism.
Predicting future trajectory. To estimate the relative pre-
dictive power of these user characteristics factors and com-
pare them with natural baselines we formulate three new
future prediction tasks: one for departure, one for long-term
recidivism, and one for short-term recidivism. Each task
is run on the respective paired sets of users previously de-
scribed, resulting in a balanced prediction task.
For transparency, we train a simple SVM classifier with our
activity features as input, employing both the normalized and
unnormalized versions of the activity level features. In each
prediction task, hyperparameters for the SVM are selected
through iteration over different combinations on a held-out
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Figure 5: Difference between the community engagement patterns of recidivist and reformed users (solid bars). From left to
right: receiving activity level, contributed activity level, receiving activity spread, contributed activity spread. For reference,
hashed bars compare users that get blocked for the first time with those that never get blocked.
Long-term Short-term
Feature set Departure recidivism recidivism
Baseline: reason 59.0% 52.9% 51.9%
Baseline: duration 56.7% 50.0% 43.8%
Community age 58.6% 58.7%∗ 56.3%∗
Engagement patterns 61.4%∗ 59.0%∗ 59.1%∗
Engagement + Age 66.2%∗ 60.6%∗ 58.8%∗
Table 2: Accuracies on three post-block trajectory prediction
tasks (random baseline is 50%). ∗s indicate results that are
significantly outperforming the best performing baseline
for the respective task (p < 0.05).
development set, and accuracy is reported using leave-one-
out cross-validation on the rest of the data.
We consider as features the user characteristics introduced
earlier, calculated based only on information available before
the block: community age and engagement patterns (activity
level and spread). We compare their predictive power to two
natural baselines that indicate the type and duration of the
initial block. These account for the fact that certain kinds of
offenses might be inherently more or less likely to lead to
departure or recidivism.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the prediction experi-
ments. We find that both community age and engagement
patterns outperform baselines in all three prediction settings,
showing they encode additional information about the future
trajectory of the individual. Furthermore, they also combine
to outperform each individual feature, showing that they
capture different aspects of the phenomenon.
Overall, these results demonstrate that forecasting the fu-
ture post-block trajectory of a user is at least a feasible and
well-formed task. While our main goal in formulating these
prediction tasks is to better understand the relative impor-
tance of different factors, we advise against using the result-
ing classifiers for any applications of algorithmically-assisted
moderation. Given the sensitive nature of such applications,
a public-facing model would need to be thoroughly tuned to
ensure fair outcomes and exhaustively studied to understand
if any biases in the data are being encoded [7, 12, 54]. Un-
derstanding the sources of such potential biases in the data,
and devising mechanisms to eliminate them, constitutes an
important avenue for future work.
5 BLOCK CONTEXT
Having established the relation between general user charac-
teristics and post-block trajectories, we now seek to under-
stand how the nature and context of the block itself mediates
recidivism. Deterrence and defiance theories contrast two
possible factors that relate to future compliance [46]. The
traditional perspective is that the more severe the punish-
ment is, the more likely it is to deter the perpetrator from
misbehaving in the future [16, 27]. More recent work, how-
ever, suggests that a factor that is at least as important is
whether the perpetrator perceives the punishment to be fair
and justified [40, 52]: intuitively, individuals are unlikely to
follow rules that they perceive to be imposed by an unfair
and antagonistic society. We explore both these perspectives
in the context of online recidivism, and bring supporting
evidence for the perceived fairness perspective.
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Block severity
The severity of temporary blocks corresponds naturally to
their duration. For the purposes of this analysis, we only
consider blocks that never had their duration changed. Since
block durations are highly concentrated on the shorter end
of the scale, with extreme outliers being sparsely spread in a
long tail, we binarize durations as short (1 day or less) and
long (more than 1 day), where the cutoff of 1 day was cho-
sen because it is the median duration. Perhaps surprisingly,
we find no statistically significant difference (chi-squared
test) between these two classes in terms of recidivism rates,
neither for long-term blocks, nor for short-term blocks.
While block duration does not appear to impact future
compliance, it does correlate with departure rates: 30% of
the users receiving long blocks quit within one month after
the start of the block, compared with 24% for short blocks
(significant at p < 0.001).7 This result holds even when
controlling for the age and activity of the blocked individual.
Perceived fairness
Considering that in our online setting the actual severity of
a block does not appear to impact its effectiveness, we can
investigate how the way a user perceives their block relates
to their future compliance with community rules.8
The main challenge in addressing questions related to
user perception is capturing such a subjective notion at a
sufficiently large scale. Unlike offline studies that rely on
interviews with punished individuals to assess their percep-
tion of the fairness of the punishment [40], our observational
data does not provide direct access to such variables. We can,
however, leverage a specific Wikipedia mechanism in order
to estimate them for a subset of users: block appeals.
A block appeal is a formal avenue throughwhich a blocked
user can contest the block, admit their wrongdoing, or ask
for clemency. In response to an appeal, any moderator—not
necessarily the one responsible for the original block—may
choose to reduce the duration of the block. This happens
rather rarely, with only 15% of blocked users having their
block duration reduced. As described on Wikipedia’s official
policy page on block appeals,9 there are two reasons a mod-
erator may choose to grant an appeal. The most common
reason is clemency: if the blocked user takes responsibility
for their offense, acknowledges that they were in the wrong,
and convincingly argues that they will not offend again, the
reviewing moderator may grant a shortened block. The other
reason is if the moderator judges the original block to be
7Rather than analyzing departure during of the block as in the previous
analysis, we are constrained here to consider a fixed time window in order
to account for the time a user has to depart.
8While for brevity we only discuss long-term recidivism, the same effects
and statistically significant levels hold for short-term recidivism.
9https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Appealing_a_block
in error, e.g., due to a case of mistaken identity. However,
according to the cited Wikipedia policy, the latter scenario
is “extremely rare”, due in part to the public nature of the
moderation in Wikipedia and to the strict procedure which
blocking moderators need to undergo in order to block some-
body, which involves identifying a specific reason.
Linguistic signals. Block appeals provide two separate op-
portunities to (admittedly imperfectly) estimate how users
perceive the block. The first one is through the language
the blocked individual uses in their appeals. They can signal
whether they perceived the block as being justifiable and
acknowledge the wrongdoing or, conversely, whether they
disagree with the justification for the block and contest it.
To capture such signals we consider three types of linguis-
tic cues (Table 3) that are intuitively related to the user’s
perception of the fairness of the block. Users that apologize
signal that they acknowledge their wrongdoing; we expect
such users to perceive the block as being fair and thus to be
less likely to recidivate. Conversely, users that openly and
directly challenge their block, either by aggressively ques-
tioning the administrators or by explicitly claiming unjust
treatment, signal that they perceive the block as unfair and
thus we would expect that they are more likely to recidivate.
To capture apologizing and direct questioning we use off
the shelf tools10 that perform regular expression matching
on dependency trees [9]. To capture explicit claims of unfair-
ness we experimented with hand-building a small lexicon by
examining a sample of examples from the data:11 “unjust”,
“illegitimate”, “illegal”, “unfair”, “not fair”, “accuse” (and dif-
ferent forms), “wrongly”, “falsely”, “injustice”, “unfounded”,
“allege” (and different forms), and “unwarranted”.
We extract these linguistic cues from the messages recidi-
vist and reformed users direct at moderators during their
block, capturing their use in both formal and informal ap-
peals. Figure 6 (a-c) compares the relative ratios of recidivist
and reformed users among those that used a given type of
fairness cue or not. Compared to a baseline ratio of 45% re-
cidivism and 55% reform that consistently holds in all three
cases, apologizing corresponds to a reduction in the rate of
recidivism (chi-squared test p < 0.05), while direct ques-
tioning and explicitly calling for unfairness correspond to
a moderate increase in the rate of recidivism (p < 0.05 and
p = 0.053, respectively).
Granted appeals. A second opportunity to estimate the
user’s perception of a block is by analyzing granted appeals.
When an appeal is granted, the duration of the block is short-
ened. This positive response from the moderators arguably
signals to the user that the system is fair and that their views
10From ConvoKit: convokit.cornell.edu
11We also performed a Fightin’ Words analysis [34] to identify salient cues
not present in the sample data we examined.
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Feature Examples
Apologizing It is true that the tag-war got out of hand. I apologize if it caused any disruption.
I am deeply sorry for not understanding the whole situation, and ask for your forgiveness.
Given the recent history on the article, forgive me if claims of lawyers are met with skepticism.
Direct questioning Why was I blocked, when I had not the right, but rather the duty to remove BLP inaccuracies?
So what policy, precisely have I violated?
How is it this person won’t leave me alone and I repeatedly ask to be left alone and I get blocked?
Unfairness lexicon this block is unjustified. none of the changes were in violation of the 3rr rule.
i have alerted another administrator about your blatent and unwarranted abuse of power.
iv been wrongly accused of making up information
Table 3: Example blocked user messages exhibiting linguistic indicators of (un)fairness perception. Bolded words indicate
matched patterns.
(a) Apologizing (b) Direct questioning (c) Unfairness lexicon (d) Unblocks
Figure 6: Normalized contingency tables showing the relative ratios of recidivist and reformed users conditioned on the pres-
ence or absence of fairness perception indicators. Table cell heights are scaled to the frequencies they represent in order to
facilitate comparison between the two conditions (compare left to right in each figure).
are taken seriously. Paternoster et al. ([40], p. 169) shows that
such perceptions about the enforcing authorities decrease the
rate of recidivism offline, thus we hypothesize that this could
hold true in online settings as well. Figure 6d shows that
this principle is indeed echoed on Wikipedia; users who are
unblocked are significantly more likely to reform (p < 0.001).
This effect is even more striking when considering that, as
discussed above, the duration of the block itself has no no-
ticeable effect on recidivism and that granted appeals often
shorten the duration of the block by less than one day (the
median reduction is 22 hours).
Alternative explanations. One explanation that does not
relate to perceived fairness could be that these appeal-based
effects are simply differentiating between individuals who
did not deserve to be blocked in the first place (and thus did
not commit an offense and are unlikely to offend at all) and
those that did commit an offense. While our observational
approach precludes ruling out this alternative explanation
completely, we argue that it is at least unlikely. First, as noted
earlier, it is extremely rare for users to be blocked in error
on Wikipedia. Second, some of the linguistic effects go in
the opposite direction of what such an explanation would
predict: for example, apologizing generally comes with an
admittance of guilt, and under the alternative explanation
we would not expect such guilty individuals to have a re-
duced rate of recidivism. In fact, we find that individuals who
apologize are significantly (p < 0.001, by chi-squared test)
more likely to get unblocked than ones who do not, a pattern
that is consistent with what we would expect if unblocks
tend to be granted because of clemency (acknowledgment of
wrongdoing being one of the factors that moderators look
for when deciding whether to grant an appeal).
In an attempt to further discard explanations based on
user characteristics we also repeat these experiments after
controlling for age and activity (i.e., pairing recidivist and
reformed users based on these variables before conducting
the analysis) and found similar trends, with exception of the
unfairness lexicon (which had a moderate effect to start with
and was likely sensitive to the sample size reduction).
We argue that these observations, while not of causal
nature, at least motivate further investigations into the role
of perceived fairness in online moderation.
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6 FURTHER RELATEDWORK
Antisocial behavior. Online moderation largely addresses
the problem of antisocial behavior, which occurs in the form
of harassment [50], cyberbullying [47], and general aggres-
sion [23]. Approaches to moderating such content include
decentralized, community-driven methods [14], as well as
top-down methods relying on designated community man-
agers or moderators [33]. Prior research in this area ranges
from understanding the actors involved in antisocial behav-
ior [6, 28, 36, 42, 51] to analyzing its effects [39] to tools
for identifying such behavior [38, 53], and even forecasting
future instances [31, 55]. While inspired by this line of work,
our present study extends it by focusing on what happens
after a user is blocked for violating community rules.
Effects of moderation. Prior work has examined the ef-
fects of different kinds of moderation on online platforms.
Community-driven moderation can affect overall user par-
ticipation [8, 35] and comment quality [5] in conversations.
Centralized moderation can also have effects on conversa-
tion, mainly through the moderator’s role as an authority
figure [44]. These existing studies of moderation effects have
focused on the short term, largely operating at the level of
individual conversations. By contrast, in this work we intend
to study the long term, user level effects of moderation: what
happens to a user in the days, weeks, and months after a
moderator takes action against them?
Norms and engagement. A major factor governing en-
gagement in online communities is a sense of belonging [37],
which in many communities engenders the emergence of
community-specific norms, such as specific patterns of lan-
guage [3, 10, 19, 56]. Wikipedia is no exception: it relies on
group dynamics to promote editing productivity [26] and
quality [41], as well as participation in governance [1, 30].
Fairness in moderation. Moderation is fundamentally a
difficult process, sparking discussions about design and best
practices [2, 24], and moral questions regarding bias [45]
and free speech [21]. One interesting avenue of research in
this broad space deals with understanding the perception of
fairness. Prior work has looked at this from the perspective
of moderators, showing that moderators on the technology
news forum Slashdot frequently judge each others’ actions
as unfair, but that this rarely leads to reversal of modera-
tion decisions [29]. We instead explore the perspective of
users, exploring ways to determine when a user regards a
moderation decision as unfair.
7 DISCUSSION
We introduced a computational framework for characteriz-
ing the possible trajectory a user can take after a temporary
block: departure, recidivism, or redemption. Taking inspira-
tion from theories of offline punishment, our investigation
focused on two types of factors that are tied to these out-
comes: those related to a user’s involvement in the commu-
nity, and those related to their perception of the moderation
action affecting them.12 Overall, our work builds towards a
more nuanced approach to moderation that more broadly
accounts for the tradeoffs between possible outcomes and
that considers how the affected individuals might perceive
the moderators and their actions.
Our study has several limitations that naturally trans-
late into opportunities for future work. First, while we have
focused on the blocked users, it would be valuable to also
understand the normative effect of blocks on other users that
are witnessing them. Additionally, our study is limited to
revealing correlational effects, and different methodologies
(involving surveys or experimentation) would be necessary
to study the underlying causal mechanism.
In terms of methodology, there are several ways in which
the definitions of the post-block trajectories themselves could
be refined. While we measure departure as a binary value, in
reality community participation occurs on a variable scale
and it is possible that blocked users do not depart, but dras-
tically reduce their participation (or conversely, increase it).
Similarly, defining recidivism in terms of a second block is
an imperfect approach because it is possible that some users
reoffend without getting blocked. This is especially true in
the case of personal attacks, where each individual’s thresh-
old of acceptable behavior may vary. One possible way of
addressing this would be to combine our approach with prior
work in automated detection of toxic language [11, 42, 53].
We also note possible ways in which the factors we ex-
plore could be expanded upon. The activity features we in-
troduced in Section 4 effectively serve as crude approxima-
tions of network effects. Future work could apply a more
formal network analysis to uncover more powerful repre-
sentations of activity. Similarly, our linguistic measures of
fairness are currently limited. One immediate way of expand-
ing them would be to build a more comprehensive lexicon
of unfairness, perhaps using a semi-automated approach
based on word co-occurrences with the currently existing
lexicon items. A more sophisticated approach might involve
engineering dependency-based features similar those used
to extract apologies and direct questioning. Understanding
whether a user feels they are treated unfairly constitutes an
interesting research question on its own.
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